

Agenda : The Current Scenario of disarmament and International Security with threats faced in 21st Century.

Letter from the executive board

Dear Delegates,

It is a great pleasure and honour to welcome you to the United Nations General Assembly Disarmament and International security at Sanjay Godawat International Model United Nation 2019. We assure you a great learning experience backed with quality debate and simulation. We shall be there to catalyse discussions and help you as needed, however, remember the following before you begin reading the guide:

- We wish for committee-wide participation, fruitful and productive debate, and require your discussions to serve as a reflection to the progress made during the committee session.
- The Rules of Procedure are to be followed with utmost diligence. We expect you to adhere to the spirit of the United Nations, and hope you learn and strengthen the art of diplomacy.
- The Background Guide serves to give a general background and facilitate understanding of the topic. You must research deeper into to the topic so as to bring productive discussions to the table. Delegates, the following background guide have been designed in a manner unlike previous background guides you might have seen. It is put forth in a layman language which addresses you directly for easy understanding, and further, does not elucidate upon the given subtopics fully. The reason for the same is that provision of such a background guide is equivalent to spoon feeding and stagnates the debate.

However, the given background guide will serve the purpose of explaining what the agenda is, how the delegates should research, and what topics should be focused on – it is a stepping stone to the actual research that needs to be done. With that said and done, we are hoping for a professional, solution-oriented, well researched debate in the committee having a fruitful output and a solid solution to the issue at hand by the end of the conference.

DISCLAIMER: NO ELECTRONIC DEVICE WILL BE ALLOWED IN DURATION OF THE COMMITTEE CONDUCTING ITS FORMAL SESSION.

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Proof/Evidence in Committee

Evidence or proof is acceptable from sources:

1. News Sources:

a. **REUTERS**– Any Reuters article which clearly makes mention of the fact or is in contradiction of the fact being stated by a delegate in council.

b. **National News Agencies**– These reports, if credible or substantial enough can be used in support of or against any Party as such. Some examples are, Press Trust of India.

2. **Government Reports**: These reports can be used in a similar way as the National News Agencies reports.

3. **Government Websites** like the Ministry of home Affairs.

4. **UN Reports**: All UN Reports are considered are credible information or evidence for the Executive Board of the Security Council.

5. **UN Bodies**: Like the UNSC, GA, HRC etc.

6. **UN Affiliated** bodies like the International Atomic Energy Agency, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, International Committee of the Red Cross, etc.

7. **Treaty Based Bodies** like the Antarctic Treaty System, the International Criminal Court.

Under no circumstances will sources like Wikipedia, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch or newspapers like the Guardian, Times of India, etc. be accepted as PROOF; but may be used for better understanding of any issue and even be brought up in debate, if the information given in such sources is in line with the beliefs of a Government.

Following is a suggested pattern for researching (if required):

- Research on the allotted personality, understanding his/her thinking about the agenda.
- Comprehending the Party Policy of the allotted Personality. It includes understanding the ideology and principles adopted by the party on the agenda. It further includes studying past actions taken by the party on the agenda and other related issues –specifically analyzing their causes and consequences.
- Researching further upon the agenda using the footnotes and links given in the guide and from other sources such as academic papers, institutional reports, national reports, news articles, blogs etc.
- Understanding policies adopted by different political parties and major parties involved in the agenda. Including their position, ideology and adopted past actions.
- Characterizing the agenda into sub-topics and preparing speeches and statements on them. It is the same as

preparing topics for the moderated caucuses and their content.

- Preparing a list of possible solutions and actions that can be adopted on the issue as per your party's policies.
- Assemble proof/evidence for any important piece of information/allegation you are going to use in committee
- Keeping your research updated using various news sources, especially news websites given in the proof/evidence section.
- Lastly, we would request all the delegates to put sincere efforts in preparation and research for the simulation and work hard to make it a fruitful learning experience for all.

A lot of members have doubts such as what they are supposed to write or how should they structure their speech. This is completely up to the member. The maximum we can do is to tell you according to our experiences about how speeches are structured and content chosen for them accordingly. These are:

- Premise – Analysis – Example
- Problem – Solution – Benefits
- Past – Present – Future Scenario
- What – So what – Now what

There can be more structures. These are some of them which the members of the Executive Board have seen.

Note: The best way to debate in any format is to clearly state your opinion and justify it with substantive rational sources.

*****NOTE: THE BACKGROUND GUIDE IS JUST FOR REFERENCE AND IN ANYCASE CANNOT BE USED AS A SUBSTANTIVE PROOF IN THE COMMITTEE.**

Agenda : The Current Scenario of disarmament and International Security with threats faced in 21st Century.

INTRODUCTION

The overall context for disarmament is the building of effective security for all. Today's world is

deeply insecure, with threats that are more global and diverse than in previous centuries, ranging from climate change and social breakdown to transnational terrorism, trafficking and crime. Such threats do not fit traditional concepts of defence and military utility. They are exacerbated by military-industrial dependencies on defence manufacturers that make, supply and trade armaments, militarized 'security' equipment, and weapons materials, which resource armed violence from gangs and terrorists as well as militias and governments. Fostering 21st century security requires analyzing the drivers of insecurity and developing the policies, resources and institutions that will build and sustain genuine security.

The Acronym Institute links with other NGOs, governments and civil society to reframe peace and security issues and get rid of outdated security mindsets among governments and opinion-formers. We aim to develop cooperative approaches to prevent conflict, address the causes of weaponization at local and national levels, and demilitarize and disarm international relations. Acting as a bridge between existing and future security regimes and between academic research and advocacy, our work supports implementation of existing disarmament and control regimes relating to biological, toxin and chemical weapons, and comprehensive approaches to reduce and eliminate conventional arms, cluster munitions, landmines and other weapons that cause unacceptable harm to human beings and our environment. In line with UN Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, we work for the full participation of women in local, national and international disarmament, security and peace-building initiatives and institutions.

Future national security threats to the United States might be divided into three major categories: major power conflicts, especially those involving Russia and China; regional conflicts, including potential nuclear states such as Iran, Iraq, or North Korea; and conflicts involving terrorist groups and other nonstate organizations. Only the first two major categories will be considered here, since it is arguable whether there is any role for strategic nuclear forces in dealing with terrorism and substate threats. However, strategic conflicts can be sparked by terrorist acts, as was the case in the First World War and other conflicts.

Russia During the past 200 years European Russia has sustained a series of catastrophes including the invasion of Napoleon, the Crimean War, the First World War, the Revolution, the

Second World War, and now the transition from a communist state to something else. In each case the country recovered within a generation. Even after the Second World War, when the country was essentially in ruins, it came back to launch Sputnik within twelve years. While one cannot predict what will happen in a country so volatile as Russia, it is not unreasonable to assume that it will endeavor to return to a conventional military power while continuing to rely on a significant nuclear capability. It is clear from Russias investment in conventional military technology that it wishes to reassert its status in this area and to continue a lucrative business in the international arms trade.

China Chinas international aims are in development, but their long stated intention to reunify" Taiwan into the mainland and their territorial moves in the South China Sea indicate that they plan to play a broader role on the international stage. China has a small nuclear arsenal but one capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on American territory and interests. It is unclear at present what, if any, impact alleged Chinese nuclear espionage will have on the modernization of its nuclear arsenal. However, it is worth noting that China has several nuclear weapons systems in the advanced development stage including a new cruise missile, which presumably can carry a nuclear warhead, and new land-launched and sea-launched ballistic missiles. Road mobile nuclear capable missiles add a degree of survivability to Chinas limited nuclear arsenal. The desire to develop an operational ballistic missile submarine is another suggestion that China is concerned about the survivability of its nuclear forces and perhaps is a comment on its future goals of power projection outside of the immediate Pacific area.

Other Countries The nuclear tests of India and Pakistan again demonstrate that countries will act in their own perceived national interests, sometimes in direct opposition to the wishes of the United States or to previous treaty commitments or arrangements. Continued tensions in South Asia, including Sino-Indian tensions, bear close monitoring, but they may not directly involve the United States. The Middle East will continue to be a problem area due to the misalignment of ethnic, cultural, and national borders. The prospects for Arab or Islamic unification do not appear imminent at present, but historically this unification has relied on a charismatic leader, whose advent is difficult to predict. Continued problems in the Balkans and elsewhere in the world may tax American and allied conventional capabilities, but such conflicts are not expected

to assume a nuclear dimension in the foreseeable future. North Korea is presumed to have at least some nuclear capability and has demonstrated remarkable progress in ballistic missile technology, despite its perilous economic condition. Japan and South Korea look upon North Korea's nuclear ambitions with concern and could pursue their own nuclear programs if they felt uncertainty in the American nuclear umbrella. Similar concerns could apply to Taiwan in light of recent statements made by the Peoples Republic of China.

Nuclear engagement scenarios are not necessarily binary. Third countries may feel compelled to intervene in disputes between nuclear states or in conflicts involving weapons of mass destruction that could spill over into their territory or interests. For example, China may feel a need to act in a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. Similarly, Israel may feel a need to act in a major conflict of its neighbors that involved weapons of mass destruction.

FOREIGN WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Trends evident today suggest that by 2020 many countries in the world will have access to several important technologies.

- Weapons of mass destruction: India and Pakistan graphically demonstrated the ability of midlevel technology states to construct or obtain nuclear weapons. Chemical and biological weapons are assumed to be within the reach of many countries today.

- Long-range ballistic missile technology: It is apparent that countries like North Korea, Iran, India, Pakistan, and other countries have or will soon have the capability to project force at intercontinental distances. The developing international marketplace in these technologies may make long-range missiles available to almost any country that has the money and the basic technical capability to acquire and use them. Although such missiles may lack the precision of current U.S. weapons, they might be entirely adequate for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

- Space imaging: Commercial services already provide high-resolution images from space.

The technical capability to provide these images in real time to customers around the world should be expected to develop. Whether international agreements will be enacted to prevent collection against sensitive sites remains to be seen. At some point, Third

World countries will have the capability to launch their own intelligence satellites or will pay others to launch them, thus bypassing the need for commercial services.

- Russian weapons technology: Despite its economic troubles, Russia is committing significant resources to the research and development of advanced conventional weapons. Part of the reason for this is certainly to provide a credible defense of Russia and its vital interests. However, Russia also sees a lucrative international arms market that appreciates the low cost and operational simplicity of its weapons. One might expect more countries to have access to last generation" but quite capable Russian military technology including missiles, air defenses, submarines, tanks, and other systems.

- Advanced communications and computer technology: The spread of communications and computer technology will serve as a force multiplier for a growing number of countries. The ability to effectively employ a small number of electronic weapons against a technologically and/or numerically superior enemy is a cost-effective force-leveling tactic.

The United States will enjoy superiority in conventional and nuclear weapons as long as adequate investments are made in research and development and in the deployment of the resulting weapons systems. However, we should expect other countries to employ many of our ideas in their own defense strategy including the simple copying of our technology and doctrines, or the use of our technology to develop weapons systems of their own. They may also attempt to exploit weaknesses in our advanced technology through means such as electromagnetic weapons, chemical and/or biological weapons, and other asymmetric means."

U.S. DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Conventional Military Technology

Advances in military technology have been much discussed in the literature and are said to be leading toward a revolution in military affairs. Relevant to the present discussion, there are several advances in conventional weapons technology that deserve mention.

- Advanced precision munitions: It is already possible for cruise missiles to deliver payloads to targets hundreds of miles from their launch point with few meter accuracy.

High precision for intercontinental missiles, either land- or sea-launched, is also possible. Given that ballistic missile reentry vehicles arrive on target with velocities of thousands of meters per second, it is not necessary to have explosive payloads to destroy some classes of targets.

- Advanced real-time imagery and data fusion: Data collection from satellites and from unmanned forward platforms will enable real-time remote battle management, including the direction of precision munitions to distant, even mobile, targets.
- Antibalistic missile technology will mature if the appropriate investment is made, enabling some defense against limited missile attacks. Analogous defenses could be developed against cruise missiles and aircraft, although these threats are in many ways a tougher problem due to the greater number of potential entry points and the availability of stealth technology.
- Information warfare may develop in such a fashion to enable the United States to interdict enemy command, control, and communications.

There has been much discussion of other advanced conventional technologies including unmanned aircraft, sensor technology, beam weapons, and so on. In this paper we will focus on those technologies that could have a strategic impact and that are related to the changing role of nuclear weapons. The importance of considering future defense against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft cannot be overestimated. The inexorable advance of technology will eventually make such defenses feasible and will put them within the grasp of any country that wishes to have them. Such is the case now with reasonably sophisticated air defenses. Long range strategic planners must at least consider the return of a traditional armor /antiarmor" competition even for strategic forces. Stealth technologies, advanced countermeasures, and new technologies will affect these trades but will not change the fundamental ability of defense technologies to influence strategic thinking.

STRATEGIC FORCES TO MEET FUTURE DEFENSE NEEDS

Planning strategic forces is a highly complicated affair that must include technical, geopolitical,

and military considerations. A full analysis is not attempted here. The purpose of this section is to suggest some broad options that can be used as starting points for more detailed treatment. Although this section concentrates on strategic forces, it is worth noting that several countries possess potent nonstrategic" nuclear forces that are designed for tactical engagements. Nonstrategic forces include nuclear artillery shells, atomic demolition munitions, short-range missiles, and air-delivered bombs. While such weapons are typically lower in yield than most strategic bombs and warheads, they are still nuclear explosives with destructive power vastly greater than conventional weapons. One might expect the division between tactical" and strategic" weapons to blur in the future, especially if significant reductions in strategic arsenals occur.

Scenario 1: Status Quo

Nuclear weapons represent the ultimate defense of the nation, a deterrent against any and all potential adversaries. Combined with diplomacy and conventional military capabilities, nuclear weapons have helped to avoid a large-scale conflict between leading world powers for over fifty years. This is an astonishing achievement given the acceleration in communications and transportation that took place during this time. When the Cold War ended, the U.S. nuclear stockpile consisted of a set of highly optimized warheads and bombs on highly reliable missiles and aircraft. These weapons systems were designed primarily to counter the massive Soviet threat. They were and are the most advanced of their kind in the world. Current plans call for them to be retained essentially indefinitely. There are several good reasons for this.

- These weapons are safe, reliable, and meet performance requirements.
- We have nuclear test data that support our understanding of their operation.
- New warheads of comparable capability are difficult or impossible to field without nuclear testing.
- They can be modified in many ways to respond to changing military requirements, as was done when the B61 bomb was modified to give it an earth-penetrating capability.

This scenario maintains a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. More than one type of weapon is maintained in each leg of the triad to provide backup capability should one weapon type encounter a problem. This strategy served us well during the Cold War. Given the rapidity with



which the geopolitical situation can change, there is merit in following a prudent and conservative path for future nuclear forces.

There are several potential disadvantages to maintaining the existing stockpile indefinitely. Over time such highly optimized systems may be less well suited to military requirements.

Refurbishment and other changes will be made to aging warheads and bombs, changes that might be difficult to certify without nuclear testing. Also, the cost of maintaining these weapons is high for both DoD and DOE. In the case of DOE, an extensive infrastructure of laboratories and plants is required for the Stockpile Stewardship program, including a new manufacturing capability for plutonium pits. Finally, the current stockpile may not be credible against some set of potential adversaries. For example, if a national emergency were to develop that involved the imminent use of weapons of mass destruction against American interests, would an adversary consider our threat of a multiwarhead attack by the Peacekeeper ICBM or a Trident SLBM as overkill and hence not a realistic threat? Such a reliance on high-yield strategic weapons could lead to self-deterrence," a limitation on strategic options, and consequently a lessening of the stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons.

Scenario 2: Reduced Stockpile of Existing Designs

This scenario assumes that arms control initiatives have made it advantageous to the United States to greatly reduce our stockpile of existing nuclear weapons. It is similar to Scenario 1 with lower force levels. One can debate the merit of eliminating one arm of the strategic triad or the nonstrategic (i.e. tactical) nuclear forces under such circumstances, depending on the depth of the reductions. Cost savings associated with reduced numbers are not directly proportional to the number of weapons since a significant infrastructure is required to support any type of modern nuclear design. The cost advantage would be in the size of the required production plant and not in the diversity of technical capabilities that are required.

At very low stockpile numbers it may be useful to explicitly consider a flexible stockpile" strategy that takes advantage of the flexibility inherent in current nuclear weapon designs. The United States could have a mixed force of weapons based upon current types suitably modified to meet evolving military needs. Special consideration might be given to maneuvering reentry vehicles that can deal effectively with enemy defenses. One could consider tailored output

weapons for special applications such as those that produce an enhanced electromagnetic pulse for the disabling of electronics or those that produce enhanced radiation for the destruction of chemical or biological weapons with minimum collateral damage. (There is serious doubt in the nuclear weapons community as to whether such systems could be introduced into the stockpile without additional nuclear testing.) Careful consideration must be given to single-point failure in a reduced stockpile. For example, the use of a common missile or a common warhead for ICBMs and SLBMs would save money but would introduce a potential single-point failure in the majority of strategic forces.

In selecting weapons that would be maintained in a smaller force structure, consideration might be given to those that are the most rugged, the easiest and cheapest to maintain, and the most flexible. Highly optimized weapons may be more efficient, but efficiency can come at the cost of complexity of maintenance. Without nuclear testing, small changes caused by natural aging or required component replacements will introduce some uncertainty into the stockpile, uncertainty that must be figured into military strategy. Understanding such uncertainty is especially important if the number of weapons types is reduced, admitting the possibility of single-point failure of a large part of the force. It may be advisable to view ruggedness and ease of maintenance as principal criteria for the selection of the types and distribution of weapons within a reduced stockpile. Given the uncertainty of future military needs, the ability of a weapon to be maintained, modified, and/or certified without nuclear testing may also be an important element in the decision process.

Scenario 3: Mixed Conventional and Nuclear Strategic Forces

Reasonable assumptions about the development of advanced conventional munitions leads to a scenario where the strategic workload is carried by a combination of nuclear and nonnuclear forces. It is possible to envision nonnuclear components to each of the arms of the strategic triad. Using conventional ICBMs and SLBMs, or their projected replacements, one could design reentry warheads to achieve high accuracy. These warheads would contain smart" guidance systems that would receive intelligence handoffs from satellites or other sources before and/or during flight. Such systems would know that a target exists in a general area, be aware of its

potential movement and signatures, and be able to home in on it. Given the kinetic energy of a reentering warhead, it might not be necessary for the system to contain high explosives. Hitting the target might be sufficient to destroy it. Similar warheads could be developed for cruise missiles that could be launched from bombers, submarines, or surface warships. In the case of cruise missiles, the lower velocity of delivery would require a high-explosive warhead.

A nonnuclear long-range weapon would be especially useful against limited numbers of time-urgent weapons of mass destruction targets such as biological weapons warheads that were in preparation for use against U.S. forces. Long-range nonnuclear weapons would enable such targets to be destroyed without causing the United States to be the first to employ nuclear weapons in a conflict. The use of nonnuclear strategic weapons against Russia, China, or other nuclear states would require care, since the appearance of such a weapon on long-range sensors might be indistinguishable from a nuclear attack by the United States.

A word of caution is needed on the use of precision munitions for high-value strategic targeting: The Kosovo conflict demonstrated very clearly that just the ability to place a weapon on the designated aim point is not enough to ensure mission success. Inaccurate target coordinates provided to pilots sometimes resulted in weapons being delivered very precisely to the wrong spot. Effective utilization of precision munitions demand that a premium be placed on the collection and the analysis of target information. This includes postattack damage assessments that determine the need for follow-on attacks and the ability of the adversary to use its weapons for offense or defense.

The nuclear component in this scenario could take one of several forms. First, one could employ a small number of existing weapons designs to retain a traditional counterforce deterrent strategy. Second, one could modify existing designs to reduce their yield, relying on precision delivery to help achieve military objectives. In this case one could use existing reentry warheads or develop new ones with the precision guidance necessary to destroy moderately-hard-point targets with low yield. Third, one could design and deploy a new set of nuclear weapons that do not require nuclear testing to be certified. Such weapons might be, but do not need to be, based on simple gun-assembled uranium designs that do not require a plutonium infrastructure and that do not require the same sophistication in nuclear weapons science and

engineering as our current stockpile. However, nothing comes for free, and one must recognize that such simple weapons have important, perhaps fatal, tactical limitations that would preclude their use in some engagement scenarios. Also, such simple devices would be based on a very limited nuclear test database and would require extensive and expensive flight testing to assure that they could be delivered with the required precision. Fourth, one could consider a combination of new or modified low-yield warheads and some existing higher-yield designs to be retained against the possibility of unexpected developments in adversaries defenses or of the need to hold very hard targets at risk. In this case one would need to retain much of the infrastructure of the current stockpile to ensure the continued performance of these highly optimized weapons. Savings could be achieved in the size of the plant complex required to remanufacture components and complete weapons.

Scenario 4: Prospects for Wholly Non-nuclear Strategic Forces

It is almost impossible to conceive of technological and political developments that would enable the United States to meet its defense needs in 2020 without nuclear weapons. There are several reasons for this. First, nuclear weapons continue to play a vital role in deterring other countries from launching significant military strikes against America, our allies, or our vital interests. The real threat of not just military defeat but national annihilation is a potent deterrent now and should be expected to remain so for at least the next few decades. Second, it does not appear possible with current or projected technology to assure ourselves that there are no and never will be any nuclear weapons in the hands of potential adversaries. Given the unique destructive power of nuclear weapons, an asymmetry of this kind should be unacceptable to American military planners. Third, the development of antiballistic missile defense is encouraging, but the assumption that a leak-proof shield can be fielded by 2020 is debatable. Fourth, some targets will not be able to be held at risk by any type of conventional weapon because of their extreme hardness. Fifth, the ability of an adversary to deliver a nuclear weapon by aircraft, cruise missile, naval vessel, or by clandestine insertion into this country are additional concerns beyond the long-range ballistic missile threat. Lacking the ability to deter such threats and to respond in kind would open up the country to blackmail.

It is critical in any discussion of strategic forces to consider the overall stability provided by

technology and policy. Such calculations have become considerably more complex in the multipolar world that is expected to persist at least over the time scale addressed in this paper. The future is unpredictable, but we can count on it to be dynamic. Strategic thinking must be flexible and must consider the evolution of several possible futures, each of which has branches that are contingent on the geopolitical situation and technological capabilities here and abroad. Countries will respond to technology and policy developments in the United States and elsewhere. We must be careful that any changes to our strategic position make the overall situation better and not worse.

Russia has already promised that it will use asymmetric means" to counter advanced U.S. technology. Official Chinese publications indicate that China will likely follow a similar strategy. The capabilities of their own research and development complex should not be underestimated. While Russia cannot yet match the United States in the most sophisticated technology, it has shown a remarkable ability to achieve military objectives through cleverness and sometimes through brute force. Finally, the development of advanced conventional strategic weapons could push the Russians to an even greater reliance on high-yield nuclear weapons. Rather than an evolution toward some fixed strategy, strategic thinking should be done along a flexible time line that recognizes changes in the world and in military technology. What may work at one time may not work at another time when the situation has substantially changed.

One asymmetric" counter to advanced technology is cyber-warfare, including non-explosive weapons that could disable or render ineffective advanced conventional or even nuclear munitions. Precision kill requires sophisticated electronics, and electronics can be affected by various means such as radio frequency or microwave weapons. Russias electromagnetic weapons program is perhaps the most advanced in the world, and at least some of this technology has been shared with China. Given the uncertainty in future advanced weapons technology, the United States may wish to retain some higher-yield nuclear weapons as hedges against the development of potent point or area defenses. The development of antisatellite weapons would create a similar complication to the United States if we were to rely on advanced conventional weapons that require precise targeting information to be effective. Arms control initiatives will play an important role in the planning of future strategic forces.

Proposed deep reductions in nuclear stockpiles may be a motivation for using conventional weapons as part of the strategic weapons mix. Such a decision will strongly depend on whether warheads or launchers are the counted quantity. If nuclear warheads and not delivery vehicles are the counted quantity, then existing or new launchers can be equipped with advanced conventional warheads. If missiles and aircraft are the counted quantity, we will need to be careful about treaties that allow only one warhead, nuclear or conventional, on a missile.

Maintaining an effective deterrent requires a minimum number of nuclear weapons, and the dilution of our forces with conventional weapons could drive us from a counterforce strategy (military targets) to a countervalue strategy (cities) with attendant ethical and perhaps legal problems.

Arms control agreements can assist in strategic planning by restricting certain classes of weapons or targets. If, in some scenario, our weapons are particularly susceptible to nuclear interceptors, then we may wish to negotiate the elimination of nuclear interceptors in return for some other concession. If we are unable to destroy one or more targets by any weapon in our arsenal, we may want to attempt to negotiate away the target in return for assurances that we will not construct similarly hard targets in the United States. Such negotiations are by nature complex because they involve giving up different commodities on each side. However, the advantages of reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, with their large radii of destruction, might be an incentive. Also, the development of new conventional strategic weapons, the use of which might be incorporated into nonnuclear war planning and that will not necessarily lead to national destruction, should be considered with care.

One of the features of nuclear weapons is that they are so destructive that their use is reserved for only the most extreme cases. Making strategic weapons more usable" could start the United States on a path of escalation that could exacerbate and not reduce the potential for war.

Conversely, lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons in response to a strategic situation could raise the level of care with which countries interact. This points to the need for a detailed stability analysis to be performed as a prelude to any arms control negotiations. Such an analysis must explicitly include the balance of nuclear forces, the state and projected future of ballistic missile defenses, and the ability of advanced conventional weapons to perform

missions formerly assigned to nuclear weapons. The weapons research and development programs of potential adversaries will provide input to this analysis by providing pointers to future defense capabilities. And, of course, any analysis of future strategic weapons needs must necessarily consider the possible geopolitical situation that will be present at the time of their deployment. Finally, the distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons will fade for small stockpiles. Both types of weapons must be included in negotiations for overall stability to be maintained.

Another important consideration in planning future strategic forces is cost. Nuclear weapons systems are sometimes considered expensive to maintain due to their complexity, their unique characteristics, and the lack of private industry support of some components of their infrastructure. In fact, nuclear weapons are cheaper to develop and to maintain than very large conventional force structures. This was the reason why NATO chose to rely on nuclear weapons as a principal part of its defense against the massive Soviet conventional threat in Europe. Nuclear weapons are considered expensive today because they are primarily strategic in nature and we are in the midst of a strategic pause" that has lessened the perceived need for strategic weapons.

As stated earlier on the world is at the brink of seeing a shift of the centre of gravity from the transatlantic/European area to the Pacific although the key area of world politics will remain for the near to mid term the enlarged Middle East. In the Pacific the U.S. and China (PRC) will be the two key players and the key question for the next two to three decades will be whether this relationship will be cooperative or confrontational. It is fair to assume that this relationship will for quite some time be more cooperative than confrontational since these two powers depend on each other in an almost symbiotic way: The Americans need the Chinese money for financing the credit-based American way of life and the Chinese need the Americans as customers who buy a large portion of Chinese products. This does not rule out, however, that there will be conflicts over access to scarce resources, over regional issues ranging from Taiwan to other disputed islands to the larger question of dominant influence in India, Pakistan and Central Asia and over financial and trade issues. Most of these issues will probably be settled through regional arrangements as China is for the time being not interested in any



conflict with the U.S. On the contrary, apparently China wishes the U.S. to remain the guarantor of Asian/Pacific security since the PRC is for the time being simply not capable of playing this role. China will for quite some time be absorbed by its huge domestic problems ranging from substantial unemployment, tremendous environmental problems to the destabilising effect of modern economies and the information age on an outdated ideology. In the meantime China is positioning itself on the world markets for energy, scarce metals and minerals and it is improving its geostrategic position. There are substantial Chinese activities in Latin America and there is a considerable Chinese presence in Africa, there are huge Chinese investments in the Afghan copper mines and there are the strategically positioned harbour construction efforts in Myanmar, in Sri Lanka and Pakistan which apparently serve a twofold strategic objective: denial of Indian control of the Indian Ocean and circumvention of the Straits of Malacca through which a large portion of Chinese imports, notably oil, is shipped. In addition, one can note the rapidly progressing modernisation of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army with main emphasis on some regional maritime power projection and on cyber operations. One could imagine that the final decision in the new Forbidden City of Beijing is not yet taken on whether one should confront the U.S. or cooperate with them and that such a decision will most probably not be taken within the next twenty years or so. This is the chance for the entire world to push the two competitors into the direction of cooperation. Latin America will have to play an important role and Europe plus Russia as well. There should be no doubt on one strategic reality: Europe will remain on the side of the Americans for security reasons as well as for ethical reasons. We Europeans share after all common values and convictions with our American allies and friends such as democracy, the rule of law and the respect for Human Rights as do most Latin American countries. Should the U.S. succeed in keeping Europe firmly on their side, should they succeed in forging a true partnership with Russia and should they also succeed in fostering friendly relationships with the majority of the Latin American countries then the chances will grow that the US will remain the world's leading power and that the Chinese /American relationship will be cooperative. This means for Europe, however, that the Europeans have to do more than today to become a player who can use all instruments of international politics. Based on this macro-weather forecast I turn to the reasons of crises and conflicts in the



decades to come.

Another important idea is the establishment of nuclear weapons-free zones (NWFZs) in different regions of the world. There are already treaties for five such zones: Antarctica, Latin America, South Pacific, Africa, and Southeast Asia. There are two areas in which the emergence of NWFZs is feasible and strongly desirable because of their strong practical and political effect on the NWSs—Central Asia and Central Europe. The latter especially would undo some of the damage that has been done by NATO enlargement. When Germany reunified, it was agreed that there would be no missile deployment ever in the eastern part which was re-joining. Furthermore, Warsaw Pact deployment in Poland and Czechoslovakia was, of course, dismantled. No such commitment was demanded of the western part of Germany, however. Although NATO leaders have said they have no intention of restoring deployments of missiles in the new member countries of NATO, this is only by way of assurance; it is not a formalised treaty commitment. Indeed, such deployment possibilities are written into NATO rules and both Poland and Czechia have publicly declared their willingness to accept such deployment, if necessary. A Central European NWFZ would involve just such a formalised abnegation by these countries as well as dismantlement of missiles in the western part of Germany. Russia is very much in favour of a Central European NWFZ. It has also endorsed the Kirghizia plan for a Central Asian NWFZ, which is now very much on the cards. Its establishment will give another fillip to the process of spreading NWFZs and to the general momentum of disarmament. Meanwhile, an international conference to evaluate existing NWFZs and identify/promote new ones (e.g. in Central Europe, the Middle East, Nordic states, South Asia, Northeast Asia, etc.) is being planned for some time in late 1999 or early 2000.⁷ Clearly, there is abundant scope for a series of initiatives, which must be of both the incremental and absolutist type. That is to say, we need a blend of political efforts, some of which in the name of realism emphasise the importance of a step-by-step process of restraint and disarmament as well as those that keep the goal always in sight and stress the urgency of rapid movement towards it. That is why another actively pursued alternative to the setting up of a multilateral committee to negotiate nuclear disarmament must be pursued. This is the initiative of pressing for a Nuclear Weapons Abolition Conference and Convention. In this regard, the work that has already been done in



drafting a model Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) by an international team of lawyers, scientists, disarmament experts and policy-makers is very important. It is no one's case that the only thing left now is to get states to agree on such a model draft. But it does mean that discussion on total abolition has been concretised in a way that did not exist earlier. Already, this has advanced the discussion on the principles and means for verification of an NWC. Moreover, one way actually to initiate the NWC process is not to wait for some or all the NWSs to agree to its institutionalisation but simply to start such an NWC off once a critical mass of NNWSs have agreed to be part of it and begin discussing this among themselves. Though the NPT has been indefinitely extended, its review conferences and PrepComs continue to provide another arena for maintaining the pressure for total disarmament. Countries like Mexico, in particular, have become sufficiently fed up with the procrastinations of the NWSs as to indicate that their own allegiance to the NPT cannot permanently be taken for granted. Countries like Australia, Canada, Egypt, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden have become more forceful in pressing for total disarmament and in insisting that the NWSs fulfil their bargain according to Article VI in the NPT. We mentioned earlier the crucial importance of institutionalising the relationship between CSOs, certain anti-nuclear mass organisations like the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in Britain (with 40,000 members) and anti-nuclear campaign groups in Germany (which are presumably in fairly close cooperation with the powerful Greens), and the country-members of the New Agenda Coalition plus other activist governments outside of it such as Canada and Australia. We can only re-emphasise this. The overall context, then, is fairly summed up by saying that there is an overall plus to be registered on the side of nuclear disarmament and restraint after the end of the Cold War. But the slow yet uncertain forward march that seemed to be represented by the signing of the CTBT has received a terrible jolt by the Indian and Pakistani nuclear breakout. However, the momentum has not yet been fully reversed by those actions. It is still possible to resume that slow, difficult, frustrating, uncertain, but nonetheless forward, march. That was perhaps the most accurate overall assessment of the whole post Cold War disarmament momentum. Whether we can not only succeed in this but even accelerate the pace of the forward movement is the key question.



In this regard what is accomplished or not accomplished in the next ten years could well prove decisive for the coming century.

Note: Please note that nothing mentioned in this background may be used as an established fact in committee without the presentation of a credible source and substance mentioned. The guidemay act only as a source for your basic understanding of the agenda.

Reiterating, kindly do not limit your research only to these points and feel free to broaden your horizons of research. This is just a list of topics you should cover and is a reflection of the direction in which we intend to see the flow of debate in the committee.

For any further queries kindly feel free to mail the Speaker directly at the email ID given above in the letter from the Executive Board.

